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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the annual meeting of the North American Securities 
Administrators Association, which represents state regulators, the 
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, William H. 
Donaldson, announced an “initiative to promote increased 
cooperation between state and federal securities regulators.”1  
Donaldson stated that “everyone in this room is committed to 
 
†     J.D. Seton Hall University School of Law, 2004; B.A. Seton Hall University, 
2001.  I would like to thank Professors Timothy P. Glynn, Stephen J. Lubben, and 
Charles A. Sullivan for providing me with invaluable advice and assistance in the 
writing of this article. 
 1. Riva D. Atlas, S.E.C. Chief Plays Down Clash with State Attorneys General, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at C2. 
1
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rooting out fraud and corruption in our markets and otherwise 
protecting investors.”2  Donaldson was responding specifically to 
media reports of a clash between state and federal securities 
regulators.3  Although Donaldson attempted to downplay the 
“supposed clash,” these clashes are increasingly common.4  Indeed, 
after stating that a commission was being formed to “study and 
propose ways to improve federal and state cooperation in 
significant enforcement activities,” Donaldson criticized the actions 
of Oklahoma’s Attorney General, Drew Edmondson, as potentially 
undermining the federal investigation and prosecution of 
WorldCom.5  According to Donaldson, Edmondson is “refight[ing] 
an old battle”6 and his actions could “impede and delay the 
administration of justice.”7 
In late August of 2003, Edmondson filed criminal charges 
against WorldCom and several former executives on behalf of the 
State of Oklahoma.8  The complaint accuses Bernard Ebbers, 
former WorldCom Inc. chief, and other WorldCom executives of 
“breaking state securities laws by giving false information to 
investors in 2000.”9  Although the SEC had conducted its own 
investigation into WorldCom and indicted the former chief 
financial officer and other junior executives, it had not taken 
action against Mr. Ebbers.10  According to Edmondson, his actions 
against both WorldCom and several of its executives were justified 
because the “WorldCom debacle cost the state pension fund $64 
million.”11  Additionally, Edmondson asserted that WorldCom had 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Allan Chernoff, WorldCom Case Ignites Turf Battle, Aug. 27, 2003, at 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/08/27/news/companies/turf_war/ (last visited 
May 15, 2004). 
 8. Atlas, supra note 1.  In November, Edmondson dropped the charges 
against Mr. Ebbers “but promised to refile them once Mr. Sullivan had been 
retried.”  Kenneth N. Gilpin & Barnaby J. Feder, Ebbers, Ex-Chief of WorldCom, Is 
Indicted on Federal Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at C5. 
 9. Ron Jenkins, Oklahoma Charges Ebbers, Other Former WorldCom Executives, 
MISSISSIPPI SUNHERALD, Aug. 27. 2003, at http://www.sunherald.com/mld/ 
sunherald/news/politics/6629942.htm (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 10. Id.  Although federal charges were not yet filed when Edmondson filed 
state criminal charges against Ebbers, the federal government recently indicted 
Ebbers on federal criminal charges.  See Barnaby J. Feder & Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-
WorldCom Chief Is Indicted by U.S. in Securities Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at A1. 
 11. Barnaby J. Feder, Ex-WorldCom Chief Pleads Not Guilty to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, 
2
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not “purged itself of wrongdoing” by filing for bankruptcy.12  
Rather, according to Edmondson, WorldCom is being “rewarded 
for its bad acts.”13 
In contrast, although Donaldson initially criticized New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer for failing to give the SEC notice of 
his enforcement actions against mutual funds and hedge funds for 
improper trading, Donaldson later stated that, unlike Edmondson, 
Spitzer’s efforts resulted in “state action [which] clearly opened a 
new front in our efforts to ensure all investors are treated 
fairly . . . .”14  Last year, Wall Street investors were caught off guard 
when Spitzer alleged that “research reports generated by Wall 
Street analysts were tainted.”15  According to Spitzer, Wall Street 
firms “wrote glowing reports on companies they knew were flawed” 
in order to win investment banking business.16  Spitzer produced 
“damning e-mails in which analysts trashed stocks they were 
recommending to investors.”17  In sharp contrast to his criticism of 
Edmondson’s actions, Donaldson has applauded Spitzer’s efforts 
and has stated that “the SEC is working closely with Spitzer to see 
that appropriate action is taken against all wrongdoers.”18 
Donaldson’s remarks remind us that state action can be both 
extremely beneficial and problematic.  Recognizing the importance 
and value of state enforcement actions is crucial because the House 
of Representatives is drafting legislation “that would limit state 
powers to curb [abuses on] Wall Street”19 in order to establish the 
preeminence of the SEC “as the national securities regulator.”20  
 
Mar. 4, 2004, at C5. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Atlas, supra note 1; see also Charles Stein, Watchdogs Zero In: Mutual Funds 
Are on the Hot Seat Over Suspected Unfair Trading: While New York’s Spitzer Grabbed 
Focus, Galvin Was Conducting His Own Inquiries in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Oct. 5, 2003, at D1 (explaining that Spitzer was not the only state official 
investigating improper trading by mutual funds; Massachusetts Secretary of State 
William F. Galvin, like Spitzer, was conducting his own investigation into what he 
called, “two sets of rules, one for the average citizen and one for the insiders”). 
 15. Stein, supra note 14. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Jeanne Zurlo, SEC Chairman Announces Cooperative Effort With States, Sept. 
16, 2003, at http://wallstreet.cch.com/news/headlines/page320.asp (last visited 
May 15, 2004). 
 19. Fraud Investigations Pressure Those Backing Bill to Curb State Powers, 30 
SECURITIES WEEK 36, 36 (2003). 
 20. Id. 
3
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The bill “prohibits states from imposing penalties that differ from 
the SEC, NYSE, and NASD.”21  Its primary sponsor is Representative 
Richard Baker of Louisiana, the chairman of the House Financial 
Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises.22  Baker argues that this 
legislation is needed “to avoid costly and disruptive overlapping 
prosecutions by state and federal regulators.”23  The SEC has not 
officially taken a position on the legislation but many believe it 
favors the bill.24  Both state securities regulators and investor 
advocacy lobbies, not surprisingly, have strenuously opposed it.25 
Although passing this legislation will be difficult because of the 
recent disclosures by both New York and Massachusetts officials 
that their state-backed investigations have uncovered illegal trading 
in the mutual funds industry, questions remain as to the proper 
role of the states in securities enforcement.26  Much has already 
been written about the general relationship between federal 
securities laws and state securities laws, but this article will argue 
that, contrary to the trend found in both academic literature and 
the proposed legislation, state enforcement of securities laws is 
essential.  This conclusion is drawn from public choice theory, 
which, as applied to this area, suggests that multiple, independent 
enforcement agencies will best protect the investing public. 
Neither the Securities Act of 1933 (the “33 Act”) nor the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “34 Act”) completely 
preempt state securities laws.  Much contemporary literature, 
however, questions the continued role of the states in light of 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Zurlo, supra note 18; see also Stein, supra note 14. 
In fact, state regulators were handed a victory when the “House Financial Services 
Committee struck language from an investor protection bill that would have 
diluted the powers of state securities regulators when they pursued fraud cases.”  
Gretchen Morgenson, State Regulators Win Some, Lose Some, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 
2004.  With this victory, however, also came a loss.  “New regulations issued by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the federal overseer of banks that is 
part of the Treasury, placed all authority to regulate national banks at the federal 
level.”  Id.  As a result, “state banking laws have been pre-empted.”  Id.  Many, 
including Eliot Spitzer, have objected to these new regulations and have cited the 
fact that state banking regulators themselves have argued that consumers will be 
hurt because “[t]here are local issues in banking that are best addressed by the 
states.”  Id. 
4
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recent actions taken by Congress and the Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (the “SROs”) to strengthen both corporate 
governance regulation and securities regulation.  To make a case 
for dual enforcement of securities regulation, this article will 
examine the following: 1) the history of the blue-sky laws; 2) the 
resulting inadequacies of the state blue-sky laws; 3) the history and 
justifications for enacting the 33 and 34 Acts; 4) the extent of 
preemption by the 33 Act and 34 Act; and 5) the present debate 
over dual enforcement. 
This article concludes that public choice theory shows that the 
states should be involved in the enforcement of securities 
regulation.  Investor confidence is essential to the protection and 
integrity of the securities market.  Because public choice theory is 
based on the assumption that most politicians, bureaucrats, and 
other decision-makers are rationally self-interested, the most 
vigorous method for securities enforcement includes a system of 
dual regulation.  Those who oppose this type of regulatory system 
might argue that this method of dual securities enforcement is 
inefficient.  This article, however, argues that dual regulation of the 
securities market is actually extremely efficient.  Dual regulation, 
regulation by both the state and federal government, is an efficient 
method of regulating the securities market because federalism 
itself is efficient.  This article will illustrate that the core values of 
federalism, citizen participation in government, efficiency in 
government, creative experimentation, and diffusion of power are 
served by having a dual regulatory system. 
II. HISTORY OF THE BLUE-SKY LAWS 
Between 1911 and 1933, specialized state statutes known as 
“blue-sky” laws were almost exclusively responsible for the 
regulation of securities sales in the United States.27  State blue-sky 
laws were a response by the state legislatures to securities fraud and 
other serious abuses in unregulated markets.28  In order to combat 
 
 27. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 
TEX. L. REV. 347, 348 n.1 (1991) (noting that there was “some federal regulation of 
securities sales during this period under the postal fraud laws, but the level of 
enforcement was minimal”). 
 28. Id. at n.7 (citing VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA—A 
HISTORY 162-63 (Ralph W. Hidy ed., 1970) (“Suffering heavy losses, the victims of 
these [securities] frauds and misrepresentations agitated for protection, then 
joined with other dissatisfied midwesterners to elect reform administrations that 
promised them relief from such abuses.”); LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE 
5
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these abuses, many states “adopted legislation requiring that 
securities proposed to be sold in a state be submitted to an 
administrative agency for review as to their ‘merit’ or intrinsic 
worth.”29  Other states, not wanting to impose this type of “merit” 
regulation, required only disclosure of information “about the 
issuer and registration of dealers.”30 
This wave of blue-sky legislation was, at least in part, due to the 
work of Kansas Banking Commissioner J.N. Dolley.31  Dolley is 
credited with developing blue-sky legislation and promoting it 
throughout the nation.32  In 1911, Dolley persuaded the Kansas 
legislature to become the first state to adopt his proposal.33  The 
Kansas law “generally required that firms selling securities in 
Kansas obtain a license from the bank commissioner and file 
regular reports of financial condition.”34  In addition, “[i]nvestment 
companies were . . . required to file reports of their business plan 
and financial condition and to file a copy of all securities they 
proposed to sell in Kansas.”35  The statute also authorized the bank 
commissioner 
to bar an investment company from the state if he 
concluded, upon examining these documents, that the 
information about the investment company or security 
 
SKY LAW 7-8 (1958) (asserting that blue-sky laws grew out of an awareness of “the 
many instances in which unsophisticated . . . investors had been bilked of their life 
savings by sellers of worthless or fraudulent securities”); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 44-45 (1982) (describing Kansas’s statute, the 
first blue-sky law, as a response to “the failure of lax state corporation statutes to 
prevent securities fraud”); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory 
Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 18-33 (1983) (citing pre-1934 state blue-
sky laws as evidence of the fact that securities fraud was considered a serious and 
widespread problem before the enactment of the federal securities acts); Murray J. 
Edelman, Securities Regulation in the 48 States (July 1942) (manuscript published 
by The Council of State Governments) (citing Justice McKenna’s opinion in Hall 
v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U.S. 539 (1917), as a typical justification of state securities 
legislation as a means of protecting the public from the “evil” of speculative and 
fraudulent schemes)). 
 29. Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 348-49 (internal citations omitted). 
 30. Id. at 349 (internal citations omitted). 
 31. Id. at 350; see also LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 7 n.22 
(1958); Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing 
Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 231 (2003).  
 32. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 361; see also Mahoney, supra note 31, 
at 231-32. 
 33. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 231; see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES 
REGULATION 16 (2d ed. 1997). 
 34. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 361. 
 35. Id. 
6
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proposed to be sold contained any “unfair, unjust, 
inequitable or oppressive” provision, or that the 
investment company was “not solvent and did not intend 
to do a fair and honest business, and . . . did not promise 
a fair return on the stocks, bonds, or other securities . . . 
offered for sale.”36 
Dolley’s efforts, both in Kansas and throughout the country, 
combined with the economic conditions of the time37 and pervasive 
public revulsion against fraudulent securities practices, helped 
blue-sky legislation gain national attention.38 
As awareness increased, however, so too did interest group 
activity.39  State blue-sky legislation was both supported and 
opposed by defined vested interests.40  Interest groups supporting 
the Kansas model included the owners of small banks and savings 
institutions “who saw blue-sky legislation as a means for suppressing 
competition for depositors’ funds,”41 state banking regulators who 
were “interested in protecting and expanding their regulatory turf 
and in advancing the financial interests of banks under their 
supervision,”42 and farmers and small-business owners who “saw the 
suppression of securities sales as a useful means for increasing their 
own access to bank credit” by excluding competition from out-of-
state borrowers.43  The nation’s elite investment bankers were the 
 
 36. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210). 
 37. See id. at 350. 
Economic conditions—a sustained period of inflation and high 
nominal interest rates—threatened the ability of small banks and 
savings institutions to attract or retain consumer deposits in 
competition with higher yielding securities and restricted the supply of 
credit to local borrowers.  This threat gave both small banks and local 
borrowers an interest in suppressing the activities of out-of-state 
securities firms.   
Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 351 (“[I]nterest group activity generally appears to be greater at 
times when the interest group is suffering an economic downturn, or the threat of 
a downturn, than when it is enjoying prosperity.”); see also Elisabeth Keller & 
Gregory A. Gehlmann, Symposium: Current Issues in Securities Regulation: Introductory 
Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 332-34 (1988). 
 40. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 351; see also Keller & Gehlmann, 
supra note 39. 
 41. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 351. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 367 (stating that farmers were supporters of blue-sky laws because 
they needed both mortgage financing and temporary credit between planting and 
harvest seasons). 
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group principally opposed to this type of blue-sky legislation.44  
Although the bankers did not object to suppressing speculative 
securities, they believed blue-sky legislation would “restrict the 
activities of reputable investment firms.”45  Joining the investment 
banks in opposing blue-sky legislation were large issuers of 
securities, who wanted to “preserve their ready access to low-cost 
financing in the public securities markets,” and the nation’s bigger 
banks, although they do not appear to have been lobbying as 
actively against the legislation.46 
The type of regulation adopted by the states varied depending 
on which interest groups were active in that state.47  For example, 
the more stringent blue-sky statutes—those similar, if not identical 
to, the Kansas model—were “adopted in agricultural states without 
a significant presence of large banks, investment houses, or major 
manufacturing firms.”48  The agricultural states following, at least in 
part, the Kansas blue-sky model were Arizona,49 Vermont,50 
Louisiana,51 Arkansas,52 Idaho,53 Michigan,54 Montana,55 North 
Dakota,56 Ohio,57 South Dakota,58 Tennessee,59 and West Virginia.60 
 
 44. Id. at 351. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 352, 377-78. 
 49. Id. at 377 n.180 (citing Act of May 18, 1912, ch. 69, 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
338 (vesting enforcement powers in the state corporation commission)). 
 50. Id. n.181 (citing Act of Feb. 13, 1913, No. 170, 1912 Vt. Laws 196 (vesting 
enforcement power in the state bank commissioner)). 
 51. Id. n.182 (citing Act of July 1, 1912, No. 40, 1912 La. Acts 47). 
 52. Id. n.184 (citing Arkansas Securities Act, No. 214, § 6, 1913 Ark. Acts 904, 
909-11). 
 53. Id. n.185 (citing Idaho Securities Act, ch. 117, 1913 Idaho Sess. Laws 454, 
455-56). 
 54. See id. at 377 n.186 (citing Act of May 2, 1913, No. 143, § 5, 1913 Mich. 
Pub. Acts 243, 245-46). 
 55. Id. n.187 (citing Act of Mar. 13, 1913, ch. 85, § 9, 1913 Mont. Laws 367, 
370-71). 
 56. Id. n.188 (citing Supervision of Investment Companies, ch. 109, § 5, 1913 
N.D. Laws 137, 139-40). 
 57. Id. at 378 n.193 (citing Act of Apr. 28, 1913, § 16, 1913 Ohio Laws 743, 
751-52). 
 58. Id. at 377 n.189 (citing Act of Mar. 14, 1913, ch. 319, § 5, 1913 S.D. Laws 
522, 524). 
 59. Id. at 378 n.190 (citing Act of Sept. 27, 1913, ch. 31, § 5, 1913 Tenn. Pub. 
Acts 500, 502-03). 
 60. See id. at 378 n.191 (citing Act of Feb. 6, 1913, ch. 15, § 5, 1913 W. Va. Acts 
114, 117-18). 
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In contrast, in states with securities houses or significant 
manufacturing interests, as well as in states competing to attract 
corporations to charter within their borders, Kansas-style legislation 
was not as successful.61  Efforts to enact these laws failed in Nevada, 
Maryland, and Delaware, three states that were active participants 
in the market for corporate charters.62  In Indiana, the legislature 
approved a blue-sky statute but intense lobbying by investment 
bankers and manufacturers resulted in the statute being vetoed by 
the governor.63  Blue-sky legislation in Colorado was also vetoed.64  
States with active securities industries and large manufacturing 
firms—Illinois and Pennsylvania—rejected proposals for legislation 
based on the Kansas model.65  In Minnesota, a blue-sky statute was 
proposed but later defeated.66 
In still other states, some form of blue-sky legislation was 
adopted, but lacked several key features of the Kansas model.67  For 
example, both Missouri and Florida adopted legislation modeled in 
part on the Kansas statute, but the legislation omitted “the crucial 
power to reject a sale of securities if the offering did not promise a 
fair return on the investment.”68  Maine, a state competing in the 
market for corporate charters, adopted a disclosure regulation 
“patterned generally on legislation recommended by the 
Investment Bankers Association [“IBA”].”69  Georgia,70 Iowa,71 
Nebraska,72 North Carolina,73 Oregon,74 Texas,75 and Wisconsin76 
adopted legislation “requiring registration and disclosure and 
prohibiting fraud, but not permitting the exclusion of securities 
 
 61. Id. at 380. 
 62. Id. at 378. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 378 n.204 (citing Act of April 9, 1913, ch. 209, §§ 12, 21, 1913 Me. 
Laws 291, 292, 297). 
 70. Id. at 379 n.206 (citing Act of Aug. 19, 1913, No. 263, 1913 Ga. Laws 117). 
 71. Id. n.207 (citing Act of April 19, 1913, ch. 137, 1913 Iowa Laws 137). 
 72. See id. at 379 n.208 (citing Act of Apr. 21, 1913, ch. 199, 1913 Neb. Laws 
603). 
 73. Id. n.209 (citing Act of Mar. 12, 1913, ch. 156, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 249). 
 74. Id. n.210 (citing Act of Feb. 28, 1913, ch. 341, 1913 Or. Gen. Laws 668). 
 75. Id. n.211 (citing Act of Aug. 21, 1913, 33d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 32, 1913 Tex. 
Gen. Laws 66). 
 76. Id. n.212 (citing Act of Aug. 21, 1913, ch. 756, 1913 Wis. Laws 1108). 
9
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solely because they were bad investments.”77  In Massachusetts, the 
location of a leading securities exchange,78 the legislature adopted 
a blue-sky statute similar to legislation proposed by the IBA, not 
one similar to the Kansas model.79  Finally, in New York a battle was 
waged between the interest groups favoring the Kansas model and 
those opposed to it.  In the end, the IBA was able to stop the 
adoption of a Kansas-style blue-sky law.80 
Between 1911 and 1913, there was a flurry of legislative activity.  
States were called upon to respond to abuses in the securities 
market and most did so by enacting some form of blue-sky 
legislation.81  In 1914, legislative activity abruptly came to an end.82  
Perhaps the most important reason was the constitutionality of 
blue-sky legislation being attacked by the IBA.83  In a series of 
decisions, courts undercut blue-sky statutes for a variety of 
reasons.84  In 1915, however, the economic conditions began to 
drastically improve both because interest rates lowered and war-
related orders caused exports to increase.85  As a result, the interest 
groups involved began to pay less attention to blue-sky legislation.86  
Representatives for both sides attempted to achieve a compromise 
by writing a new model blue-sky law that would be accepted by 
everyone.  But the compromise failed,87 resulting in heightened 
tensions once again between those supporting, and those opposing, 
blue-sky legislation.88 
Many of the lower court decisions striking down state blue-sky 
 
 77. Id. at 379. 
 78. See id. (noting that the Boston Stock Exchange was the primary market for 
industrial securities before 1900). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See supra notes 48-80 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 380. 
 83. Id. at 381. 
 84. See, e.g., Ala. & New Orleans Transp. Co. v. Doyle, 210 F. 173 (E.D. Mich. 
1914) (stating that Michigan’s blue-sky statutes went far beyond their stated 
purpose of prohibiting fraudulent practices; the statute exceeded the state’s police 
powers); William R. Compton Co. v. Allen, 216 F. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (per 
curiam) (stating that blue-sky legislation infringed on the privileges and 
immunities of national citizenship) cert. dismissed, 239 U.S. 652 (1915); Bracey v. 
Darst, 218 F. 482 (N.D.W. Va. 1914) (holding that the blue-sky legislation violated 
the privileges and immunities clause, violated due process and burdened interstate 
commerce). 
 85. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 383. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 384-85. 
 88. Id. at 386. 
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laws were appealed to the United States Supreme Court.89  The 
Court “flatly repudiated all the lower court opinions in the IBA’s 
favor and . . . ruled against the IBA point-by-point on the 
constitutional issues.”90  Interestingly, while the IBA lost the 
individual battles, it largely won the war.91  The Court made clear 
that the blue-sky statutes could pass constitutional muster only if 
they did not regulate interstate commerce but instead regulated 
the disposition of securities within a state.92  This language 
confirmed what the IBA and others had believed for the past few 
years—that blue-sky legislation could be circumvented by “mail 
solicitations” or “other modalities of interstate commerce.”93  Thus, 
although the Court’s decisions appeared to validate blue-sky 
legislation, they instead “proved to be a charter for the business of 
unregulated interstate securities sales by mail . . . .”94 
III. RESULTING INADEQUACY OF STATE BLUE-SKY LAWS 
Blue-sky legislation appeared, at least initially, to effectively 
combat securities fraud and other abuses of the market.  It was 
soon apparent, however, that state legislation by itself was 
inadequate.95  The “increasingly interstate nature of modern 
business,” the “reluctance of many, if not most, state legislatures to 
provide for effective enforcement of . . . Blue-sky laws,” and the 
illusory nature of many of the blue-sky laws are the three reasons 
advanced to account for the inadequacy of state regulation.96 
As a result of the earlier discussed Supreme Court opinions, 
blue-sky laws could easily be evaded by disposing of securities out of 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.; see also Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 39, at 332. 
 In Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 587 (1917), Justice McKenna 
conceded that the statute burdened honest business, but only to the extent that 
“dishonest business may not be done.”  Additionally, Justice McKenna made clear 
that the blue-sky legislation in question applied only to the disposition of securities 
within the state, thus “incidentally” affecting interstate commerce.  Id. at 587-89. 
In Geiger-Jones Co. v. Turner, 230 F. 233 (S.D. Ohio 1916), rev’d, 242 U.S. 539, 559 
(1917), the blue-sky legislation was once again upheld because, as Justice 
McKenna pointed out, the legislation governed only the sale or disposition of 
securities within a state’s borders. 
 91. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 388. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 389. 
 95. 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 1-B-6, at 146 (3d 
ed. 1991). 
 96. 1 Id. at 146-47, 150. 
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state.  In addition to the problems caused by the increasingly 
interstate nature of the economy, “parsimonious state budgets 
meant [an] understaffing of state securities law programs.”97  It is 
hard to imagine how states with undersized programs could be 
expected to control “corporate entities that are sometimes bigger 
in terms of assets than the states themselves.”98  Additionally, the 
stock market crash of 1929 resulted in a crisis of investor 
confidence and a widespread panic ensued.99  Finally, by the 1930s, 
it was apparent that many of the blue-sky laws were fraught with so 
many exemptions that they were essentially an illusory protection.100  
As a result, Congress had no choice but to draft legislation 
involving the federal government in the regulation of securities. 
IV. FEDERAL 33 AND 34 ACTS: THE 33 AND 34 ACTS 
Having finally reached the point of legislating, “Congress was 
faced with a choice of conflicting philosophies.”101  Before drafting 
legislation defining the federal government’s role in securities 
regulation, Congress had to choose one of three philosophies as its 
model.  Some wanted a fraud act similar to New York’s Martin Act102 
 
 97. 1 Id. at 147-49. 
 98. 1 Id. at 150. 
 99. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 2-5 (1982). 
 100. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-B, at 150. 
 101. 1 Id. § 1-G, at 169. 
 102. New York’s Martin Act grants broad investigatory power to the Attorney 
General: 
Whenever it appears to the attorney general that, in connection with 
any security (or commodity) or investment advice, any person shall 
have employed, or employs, or is about to employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of 
any false pretense, representation or promise . . . or he believes it to be 
in the public interest that an investigation be made, he may in his 
discretion either require or permit such person . . . to file with him a 
statement in writing under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and 
circumstances concerning the subject matter which he believes it is to 
the public interest to investigate . . . . The attorney-general may also 
require such other data and information as he may deem relevant and 
may make such special and independent investigations as he may deem 
necessary in connection with the matter. 
1 Id. § 1-B, at 76 (quoting the Martin Act currently codified at N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 
352 et seq. (McKinney 1996)).  The Martin Act centralizes all enforcement, 
including criminal prosecutions, with the Attorney General.  Id. at 78-79.  
Additionally, the words “fraud and fraudulent practice are given ‘a wide 
meaning’ ” in New York.  Id. at 81 (quoting People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 
N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926)). “[A]ll acts, although not originating in any actual evil 
design or contrivance to perpetuate fraud or injury upon others, which do by their 
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or, better yet, stern enforcement of the penal laws.103  They argued 
that preventive laws would not work and would hinder honest 
businesses.104  Others wanted to have a law similar to the Kansas 
blue-sky law—that is, a law based on “merit standards.”105  This 
group would have liked the new federal act to provide for 
“revocation of registration upon an administrative finding (among 
other standards) that the enterprise or business of the issuer . . . or 
the security is not based upon sound principles, and that the 
revocation is in the interest of the public welfare,” or that the issuer 
“is in any other way dishonest” or “in unsound condition or 
insolvent.”106 
The intermediate position sought a disclosure law more or less 
like the English Companies Act,107 which rejected the idea of a 
regulatory policy by stating that “[i]t would be an attempt to throw 
what ought to be the responsibility of the individual on the 
shoulders of the State, and would give a fictitious and unreal sense 
of security to the investor, and might also lead to grave abuses.”108  
A strong proponent of this option as the preferred model for 
federal legislation was then Supreme Court Justice Louis D. 
Brandeis.109  According to Brandeis, “the law should not try to keep 
investors from making bad bargains . . . .”110 He cited the Pure Food 
Law as an example of what the law should strive for—the law 
should “help the consumer to judge quality by requiring the 
disclosure of ingredients.”111 
Ultimately, it was this latter philosophy that won out and was 
effectively the philosophy of the 33 Act,112 which became effective 
in May of 1933.113  In substance, it provided “for the filing of a 
registration statement and the use of a prospectus in connection 
 
tendency to deceive or mislead the purchasing public come within the purpose of 
the [Martin Act].”  Federated Radio, 154 N.E. at 657. 
 103. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-G, at 169. 
 104. 1 Id. 
 105. 1 Id. at 169-70. 
 106. 1 Id. at 170 (quoting S. 875 & H.R. 4313, 73d Cong., §6(c), (e), (f) 
(1933)). 
 107. 1 Id. 
 108. See 1 id. at 171 (quoting The Lord Davey Committee, Cmd. 7779, § 42 
(1895)). 
 109. 1 Id. 
 110. 1 Id. 
 111. 1 Id. at 172. 
 112. 1 Id. 
 113. 1 Id. 
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with the public offering of securities, and subjected the issuer and 
those connected with the offering to civil and criminal liabilities in 
the event of material misstatements or omissions.”114  Importantly, 
the 33 Act is essentially a combination of both the Companies Act 
and the Martin Act, with some modifications.115  The Act was 
appropriately termed the “truth-in-securities act”116 because 
Congress required only the disclosure of information that, if not 
revealed, could harm and fool the investing public.117  In 1934, the 
Securities Exchange Act was enacted because of the complexities of 
the 33 Act and “the need for an independent administrative body 
to enforce the federal securities laws, regulate stock market 
practices, and curb the evils in the stock exchanges themselves.”118  
Although the enactment of the 33 and 34 Acts may have helped 
solve the problem of inadequate state blue-sky legislation, it also 
“introduced the new problem of federal-state coordination.”119 
V. PREEMPTION: STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES 
The 33 and 34 Acts were to act as supplemental regulation to 
the state blue-sky laws because it became obvious that state 
legislation could not, by itself, effectively regulate the securities 
market.  As a result, when the 33 and 34 Acts were initially passed, 
Congress did not preempt state law.120  In fact, Congress wrote 
“savings clauses” into both acts, evidenced by former section 18 of 
 
 114. 1 Id. 
 115. 1 Id. at 177. 
 116. 1 Id. 
 117. 1 Id. 
 118. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 39, at 347. 
 119. 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-B-2, at 44. 
 120. Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities 
Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 500 (2003). 
Although this article does not make any attempt to fully analyze preemption 
doctrine and all of its complexities, a brief foray into preemption doctrine 
generally is required.  As noted by Professor Karmel, “[p]reemption may be 
express, implied, or by reason of conflict.”  Id. at 499.  Preemption is express when 
the statute explicitly mandates that state law is displaced.  Id.  Preemption is 
implied, and therefore displaces state law, “if federal law so thoroughly occupies a 
legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for 
the states to supplement it.”  Id. at 500 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).  Often, this type of preemption is referred to as field 
preemption.  Id.  Finally, conflict preemption may result in the displacement of 
state law if “either it is impossible to comply with both a state and a federal law, or 
if the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ”  Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). 
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the 33 Act,121 and former section 28 of the 34 Act.122  According to 
available legislative history, the initial 1933 Act bill, which made it 
through the House, “set forth a clause prohibiting the sale of 
securities in interstate commerce into any state if such sale would 
have violated the blue-sky laws of that state.”123  The apparent 
purpose of this clause was “to assure the states that the [Securities 
Act] was not an attempt to supplant their laws, but an attempt to 
supplement their laws and to assist them in enforcing their laws in 
those cases where they have no control.”124  Although this clause 
was later deleted by a Senate amendment,125 the “savings clauses” 
clearly illustrate that Congress’ intent in enacting the Securities Act 
was not to preempt state blue-sky laws generally.126 
Even though there was no field preemption of the state blue-
sky legislation by the 33 and 34 Acts, in 1947 the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association concluded that the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
“should be requested to consider ‘a new uniform or model State 
Sale of Securities Act’ in cooperation with the ABA ‘to the end that 
the existing diversity of legal requirements preliminary to the 
issuance of securities be minimized to the greatest possible 
extent.’”127  Drafting this legislation was an extremely difficult task 
because each state had its own regulatory philosophy.128  In 1956, 
nine years later, the Uniform Securities Act was finally promulgated 
and approved by the ABA.129  It is primarily a regulatory law130 with a 
 
 121. Id. at 500-01 (“Nothing in this Subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of 
the securities commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of 
any State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any 
security or any person.”). 
 122. Id. at 501 (“[N]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the 
securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any 
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the 
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (quoting Federal Securities Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. 117 (1933) (statement of Ollie M. 
Butler, Foreign Service Div., Dept. of Commerce)). 
 125. Karmel, supra note 120, at 501 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 10-11, 25 
(1933)).  Although the reasons behind the Senate’s actions are not clear, it may 
have deleted the clause in an effort to maximize commerce, guarding against the 
possibility that the state laws proved to be too restrictive. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-B-2, at 46 (quoting 72 ABA Rep. 
98, 297 (1947)). 
 128. 1 Id. at 47. 
 129. 1 Id.  This Uniform Securities Act was also approved in principle by the 
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four-part structure whose “first three parts [are] designed to stand 
alone or in any combination.”131  Although there were later 
attempts to write Revised Uniform 33 and 34 Acts, these discussions 
failed.132  Currently, more than 30 jurisdictions have all, or 
substantially all, of the 1956 Act in effect.133 
This dual system of securities regulation continued for some 
time without any major changes.  In 1994, the political balance in 
Congress shifted and Congress “began a broad reexamination of 
the current dual system of securities regulation.”134  During its 
deliberations over new legislation, Congress heard testimony that 
“duplicative regulation tends to raise the cost of capital to 
American issuers of securities without providing commensurate 
protection to investors or to . . . [the] markets.”135  Congress also 
heard testimony that technological advances required changes to 
facilitate the information flow to the investing public.136  The 
culmination of Congress’ deliberations was the enactment of the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 [the 
“NSMIA”].137  Congress explained its decision to enact NSMIA as 
follows: “The system of dual federal and state securities regulation 
has resulted in a degree of duplicative and unnecessary regulation.  
Securities offerings and brokers and dealers engaged in securities 
transactions are all currently subject to a dual system of regulation 
that, in many instances, is redundant, costly, and ineffective.”138 
The NSMIA constituted a partial preemption of state law in 
 
NASAA and endorsed by the SEC.  1 Id. 
 130. 1 Id. 
 131. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, at 51.  Part I of the Uniform 
Securities Act is entitled, “Fraudulent and Other Prohibited Practices.”  1 Id.  It is 
based on Rule 10b-5 and “outlaws fraudulent practices in connection with the sale 
or purchase of a security,” as well as “other undesirable investment advisory 
activities.”  1 Id. at 52.  Part II is entitled “Registration of Broker-Dealers, Agents, 
and Investment Advisors,” and deals with registration procedures and post-
registration requirements.  1 Id.  Part III of the Uniform Securities Act is entitled 
“Registration of Securities,” and it describes the registration procedures that must 
be adhered to before any security, unless the security or transaction is exempted, 
is offered or sold in the state.  1 Id.  at 53.  Finally, Part IV is a general provision 
that details how the first three parts are to be implemented.  1 Id. 
 132. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-B-4, at 52. 
 133. 1 Id. at 50. 
 134. 1 Id. at 60. 
 135. 1 Id. at 61. 
 136. 1 Id. 
 137. 1 Id. at 60. 
 138. 1 Id. at 61. 
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the securities offering and shareholder report areas.139  The NSMIA 
did not, however, completely preempt state blue-sky laws.  Section 
18(c)(1) of the Act preserves state authority “to investigate and 
bring enforcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or 
unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with the 
securities or securities transactions.”140 The NSMIA preempts the 
authority of state securities regulators to regulate the securities 
registration and offering process by imposing requirements on the 
contents of prospectuses or other offering documents.141  
Essentially, the NSMIA “preempts aspects of securities registration 
and reporting processes for specified covered securities” but does 
not “diminish state authority to investigate and bring enforcement 
actions generally with respect to securities transactions.”142 
The NSMIA expressly preserved state authority to bring 
enforcement actions with respect to securities transactions.  
Consequently, three distinct types of blue-sky laws remained in 
effect after 1996: antifraud provisions, provisions requiring the 
registration or licensing of certain persons engaged in the 
securities business, and provisions requiring the registration of 
securities.143  This article is concerned with a state’s involvement in 
the enforcement of its antifraud provisions.  These provisions 
“operate by means of investigation, injunction, and prosecution 
independently of any registration system, and typically there are no 
exemptions from their coverage.”144  A state’s antifraud provisions 
are “intended to enable the administrator to issue public warnings, 
to investigate suspected fraudulent activities, to take injunctive or 
other steps to stop them, and as a last resort, to punish them.”145 
Some forty-three jurisdictions have antifraud provisions.  Many 
of these jurisdictions have adopted the basic fraud provision found 
in the Uniform Securities Act of 1956.146  Still other jurisdictions 
have added provisions proscribing more specific manipulative 
practices.147  The remaining jurisdictions have adopted their own 
fraud provisions, not modeled after the Uniform Securities Act but 
 
 139. 1 Id. at 62. 
 140. 1 Id. at 63. 
 141. 1 Id. at 61-62. 
 142. 1 Id. at 63-64. 
 143. 1 Id. at 67. 
 144. 1 Id. 
 145. 1 Id. 
 146. 1 Id. at 69. 
 147. 1 Id. 
17
Di Trolio: Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to Blue-Sky
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
DETRILIO-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  8:11 PM 
1296 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
nevertheless addressing the same abuses of the market.148 
Although the states’ antifraud provisions have not been 
preempted by federal legislation,149 the debate continues as to 
whether states should have a role in the enforcement of securities 
laws given the recent legislation by Congress and the new 
requirements of the SROs.  This article will argue that public 
choice theory supports the involvement of the states in the 
enforcement of securities laws. 
VI. SHOULD THERE BE DUAL ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE SECURITIES LAWS? 
When the 33 and 34 Acts were enacted, they were supposed to 
act as an additional method of securities law enforcement because 
it was obvious that the states could not adequately police 
nationwide securities markets.  Regardless of the stated purpose of 
the 33 and 34 Acts, it became increasingly harder to draw a line 
between the coverage of state and federal securities laws.  
Concededly, purely duplicative regulation is in nobody’s best 
interests.  Something had to be done to ensure that what had the 
potential to be a comprehensive system of dual securities 
enforcement did not become redundant and ineffective. 
A.  The Initial Distinction Between State and Federal Securities Law 
and Its Subsequent Erosion 
Between 1977 and 1987, the Supreme Court “addressed 
securities law federalism issues in the context of drawing a line 
 
 148. See 1 id. 
 149. Although not mentioned in the text of this article, the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 [the “SLUSA”] did preempt “covered” 
securities fraud class actions under the common law and statutes of all fifty states.  
See Karmel, supra note 120, at 511-13.  The SLUSA was adopted as “a reaction 
against attempts to evade the obstacles to federal securities class actions erected by 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 by using state court class 
actions.”  Id. at 511-13.  Although SLUSA did provide that securities fraud class 
action suits covered by the statute could not be brought in state court, “state law 
continues to provide remedies for plaintiffs suing in an individual capacity and in 
class actions brought by state and local governmental entities and their pension 
funds.”  Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State 
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1998). 
This article’s focus is on the states’ ability to bring enforcement actions for 
violations of securities laws.  As a result, this article makes no attempt to cover the 
intricacies of either SLUSA or the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 
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between state corporate law concerning the fiduciary duties of 
managers and directors and federal securities law obligations 
placed on public companies and their officers and directors.”150  It 
seemed, at least from a political standpoint, that the Court was 
concerned with “restricting the coverage of the federal securities 
laws, especially in the corporate governance area.”151 
In Cort v. Ash,152 the Court attempted to articulate a distinction 
between state corporate law and federal securities law: 
“Corporations are creatures of state laws and investors commit their 
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except 
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of 
directors with respect to stock holders, state law will govern the 
internal affairs of the corporation.”153  Soon after deciding Cort, the 
Court applied its newly articulated distinction in another case 
arising under the federal securities laws, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green.154  The plaintiffs in Santa Fe wanted the Court to apply Rule 
10(b)(5) of the 1934 Act to a breach of corporate fiduciary 
duties.155  The Court, however, declined to apply federal securities 
law to the plaintiff’s claims of “internal corporate 
mismanagement.”156  Instead, the Court noted that “[a]bsent a 
clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to 
federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that 
deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established 
state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.”157  The 
Court went further in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.158 
indicating that Santa Fe “would not be confined to its facts, but 
rather was a general holding concerning federalism.”159 
Despite these initial decisions attempting to fine-tune the 
distinction between state securities law and federal securities law, 
 
 150. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 503. 
 151. Id. 
 152. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 153. Id. at 84. 
 154. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 155. Id. at 474 n.14. 
 156. Id. at 479. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 472 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 159. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 504.  Schreiber raised the issue of “whether 
the withdrawal of a hostile tender offer bid and the substitution of a partial bid, 
following negotiations with the target company’s management, constituted a 
manipulative act under the Williams Act, an amendment to the Exchange Act 
which regulates tender offers.”  Id. 
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the distinction articulated in cases such as Cort has slowly eroded; in 
fact, after recent actions by Congress and the SROs, the distinction 
has since become virtually non-existent.  Through the years, the 
role of the federal government in securities regulation has become 
less of a supporting role and more of a lead role and new 
legislation has taken central aspects of corporate governance law 
away from the states.160 
The newly enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [the “SOX 
Act”] does “not even pretend to stay on the disclosure and trading 
side of the rhetorically federal-state division of power, not even 
offering perfunctory respect for state rules governing the 
corporation’s internal affairs.”161  The SOX Act “mandates that the 
SEC require attorneys representing securities issuers to report 
evidence of material securities laws violations up the corporate 
chain of command, ultimately to the CEO.”162  The SOX Act 
further requires that should the CEO not respond appropriately by 
“adopting . . . remedial measures or sanctions,” then the lawyer 
must seek out the board’s independent directors, audit committee, 
or the board as a whole.163  Provisions such as these require that an 
attorney be a gatekeeper not just for securities law violations, but 
for any “breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation.”164  This is just 
one example of how the SOX Act has taken what was perceived to 
be a matter subject to state control—corporate control of fiduciary 
duties—and turned it into a matter controlled by federal law.165 
Additionally, SROs such as the New York Stock Exchange have 
proposed new listing requirements in 2002 that “intrude more into 
traditional state governance than ever before and . . . appear to be 
occurring as part of an interaction with federal regulators so that 
th[ey] may be part of  an indirect federalization of corporate 
 
 160. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 621 (2003) 
(discussing such burgeoning federal incursions into state law as “regulating going-
private transactions, instituting an all-holders rule, barring dual-class 
recapitalizations, . . . mandating how shareholders with almost half of the 
country’s shares treat their votes,” and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); see also 
Robert Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law 
and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 967 (2003) (discussing the idea 
that federal law “no longer fits into the supporting role category”). 
 161. Roe, supra note 160, at 633. 
 162. Id. at 623. 
 163. Id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 
Stat. 745, 784 (2002)). 
 164. Id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley § 307). 
 165. Id. 
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law.”166  The NYSE proposed listing requirements “require a 
majority of independent directors, and three important board 
committees made up of only independent directors.”167  The 
proposed listing requirements also would “change the role of 
shareholders in terms of requiring their approval of compensation 
plans beyond that required by state law.”168  These new listing 
requirements illustrate that just as the SOX Act has encroached 
upon areas traditionally left to state control, so too have the SROs.  
The question that remains is what role, if any, is left for the states in 
the securities regulation and enforcement arena. 
B.  The Debate Surrounding Dual Regulation vs. National Federal 
Regulation 
Although this article will argue that public choice theory 
supports the idea that states should maintain some role in the 
enforcement of securities laws, there have been other arguments 
raised on both sides of this debate that need mentioning.  Those 
against the states having a role in securities regulation often argue 
that blue-sky laws are too complex—they are a “crazy-quilt of state 
regulations no longer significant or meaningful in purpose, and 
usually stultifying in effect, or just plain useless.”169  Commentators 
have also noted that piecemeal state enforcement may prove 
burdensome in that it costs too much and can lead to conflicting 
results, as opposed to increased investor protection.170  A recent 
example of state enforcement that fueled the arguments of those 
opposed to state action was Oklahoma Attorney General Drew 
Edmondson’s decision to bring criminal charges against former 
WorldCom chief Bernard Ebbers and several other executives.171  
Edmondson’s actions are a response to what he perceives as 
 
 166. See Thompson, supra note 160, at 963 (noting the proposed changes to 
NYSE listing requirements can be found at www.nyse.com/pdfs/xlnv9n06.pdf).  
Other SROs, such as NASDAQ, have proposed revisions to current listing 
requirements, which can be found at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Seb_Corp_ 
Gov&uscore;SummaryFeb-revised.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004).  Id. 
 167. Id. at 965. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See, e.g., J. Sinclair Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REV. 713, 714-15 
(1958). 
 170. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 546; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Striking the 
Right Balance: Federal and State Regulation of Financial Institutions: Securities 
Regulation: Blue Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53 
BROOK. L. REV. 105 (1987). 
 171. Ex-WorldCom Chief Ebbers Is Charged, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at C8. 
21
Di Trolio: Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to Blue-Sky
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
DETRILIO-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  8:11 PM 
1300 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
insufficient punishment of WorldCom by the SEC and the 
bankruptcy process.172  Concededly, bringing state enforcement 
action just because one is unhappy with the results of an intense 
investigation led by the SEC is not an example of the good that 
state enforcement action can bring.  Such action, brought without 
any new or independent evidence, is the type of duplicative state 
action that is costly and, for the most part, largely ineffective in 
preventing future abuses or setting new precedents. 
The other side of the argument, however, is that aggressive 
state action can highlight gaps and problems in the federal 
regulatory scheme, as evidenced by the actions of New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.173  Spitzer’s investigation uncovered 
an illegal trading scheme, opening the eyes of both the SEC and 
the investing public.  As a result of the investigation led by New 
York, California, and New Jersey, 
Merrill Lynch [has] agreed, among other things: to sever 
the link between compensation for analysts and that for 
investment banking; prohibit investment banking input 
into analysts’ compensation; to create a new investment 
review committee responsible for approving all research 
recommendations; to disclose in its research reports 
whether it has received or is entitled to receive any 
compensation from a covered company over the past 12 
months; and to pay a $100 million fine.174 
Seeing such zealous law enforcement is arguably a boost for 
investor confidence.  The actions of Spitzer have been cited as a 
prime example of the states stepping in to “fill the void left by weak 
federal regulation.”175 
Additionally, commentators have posited that eliminating the 
states’ involvement in enforcing securities regulation will result in 
only selective enforcement by the federal government.176  
Responding to arguments that blue-sky laws are just too complex, 
one author has acknowledged that each state has varying blue-sky 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 546. 
 174. Id. at 520; see also Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. Dep’t of Law, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement 
to Reform Investment Practices (May 21, 2002), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press 
2002/may/may21a02.html (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 175. Karmel, supra note 120, at 522 (citing Susanne Craig, Local Enforcers Gain 
Clout on Street, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2002, at C1); see also New Cops on the Beat, 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 2002, at 77, 78. 
 176. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 160, at 634. 
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laws but notes that “there are a number of uniformity initiatives” 
that have been put before the states for approval.177  Moreover, the 
lack of uniformity among the state blue-sky laws is less of an issue 
today now that the states are limited to antifraud enforcement.178 
Finally, two practical arguments weigh in favor of leaving the 
dual enforcement scheme in place.  First, it is unrealistic to believe 
that the federal government can effectively oversee the securities 
markets and prevent securities abuses in all fifty states.  The SEC 
neglected to notice an improper trading scheme to the tune of 
almost a billion dollars taking place right under its nose in the 
biggest securities market in the United States.  This raises serious 
questions as to its ability to detect other, perhaps smaller, abuses 
taking place in other markets.  Additionally, even if there were one 
national federal standard, this standard might not be interpreted 
uniformly throughout the separate federal jurisdictions.  As it 
stands, federal courts do not interpret the same federal laws in a 
uniform manner.179  In fact, it is quite possible for each circuit to 
interpret a federal law in a different manner, thus creating twelve 
differing interpretations of one federal law.  The potential for 
confusion clearly exists even with one national federal standard. 
 
 177. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, at 146. 
 178. 1 Id. 
 179. For example, federal courts have taken differing approaches to the 
question of whether a secondary actor may be held liable as a primary violator 
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Some courts have held that 
a secondary actor may not be held liable as a primary violator under § 10(b) unless 
he or she makes material misstatements or omissions.  See, e.g., In re Kendall 
Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding 
that an accountant’s “review and approval” of financial statements and 
prospectuses is insufficient for primary actor liability); Vosgerichian v. 
Commodore Int’l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that 
allegations that an accountant “advised” and “guided” a client in making allegedly 
fraudulent misrepresentations is insufficient for primary actor liability).  Other 
courts have held that secondary actors may be held liable as primary actors for 
statements made by others in which the defendant had significant participation.  
See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that an accountant may be held liable as a primary actor based on his 
“significant role in drafting and editing” a letter sent by the issuer to the SEC); In 
re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that an 
accounting firm that was “intricately involved” in the creation of false and 
misleading documents may be held liable as a primary actor under § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
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VII.  PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 
A.  Dual Enforcement of the Market Is Necessary 
The 33 and 34 Acts, as well as state blue-sky laws, were enacted 
to protect the people and institutions investing in the market, and 
the integrity of the securities market as a whole.  Public confidence 
in investor protection is essential to the functioning and integrity of 
the securities market.180  Today, a crisis in investor confidence exists 
due to both the corporate financial scandals of Enron Corp., 
WorldCom, and other companies, as well as the market decline of 
technology stocks.181  The problem, of course, is how to achieve 
public confidence.  Public choice theory provides reason to be 
skeptical about the success of this endeavor because it is based on 
the assumption that “politicians, bureaucrats, and other decision-
makers in public life are rationally self-interested,” thereby 
“maximiz[ing] their personal power and wealth even when these 
selfish ends conflict with public-spirited goals.”182  Public choice 
theory, therefore, suggests that the mechanisms to obtain vigorous 
market enforcement in order to maintain investor confidence must 
be designed with this limitation in mind. 
Public choice theory, in its simplest terms, refers to the belief 
that “well-organized groups, seeking to advance their members’ 
self-interest at someone else’s cost, tend to win out in the public 
policy market.”183  Public choice theory “understands legislative 
 
 180. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong 
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783, 834 (2001) (discussing early empirical 
research noting the correlation between investor protection and the strength of a 
country’s securities markets); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (1999). 
 181. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 545. 
 182. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, The Decline of the Nation State 
& Its Effect on Constitutional and International Economic Law: Contribution: A Public 
Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 929 (1996) (noting that “the assumption of self-interest 
means that law is traded for political support, money, power, and other things that 
politicians and bureaucrats demand”). 
 183. Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New 
Theories of the Regulatory State: Foreword: Post-Public Choice?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267, 
268 (2002); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (1990); Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice 
and Limits on Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 280 (1990); Paul B. Stephan III, 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Barbarians Inside the Gate: 
Public Choice Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 745 
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outcomes to result from the supply and demand for political 
outcomes.”184  The interests of competing groups “may be affected, 
positively or negatively, by actions of the government.”185  
Presumably, individuals are willing to pay a price for government 
outcomes that will benefit them.  “[O]ther individuals, with 
conflicting interests, are willing to pay for opposite results.”186  A 
central assumption of this theory is that legislators are prepared to 
give the highest effective bidder the legislative results that it 
desires.187  Additionally, there necessarily will be interest groups 
seeking government inaction just as vigorously as opposing interest 
groups are seeking government action.188 
“The success of a group in outbidding competing interest 
groups and achieving legislative success depends largely on the 
total level of aggregated demand in the group for a particular 
legislative result and on the ability of the group to manifest that 
demand in an effective bribe to the legislator.”189  Whether a group 
submits an effective “bribe” is determined “by the costs the group 
encounters in achieving collective ends.”190  The costs will vary 
depending on the size of the interest group: 
The smaller the group, the more likely it is that an 
individual group member will prefer to bear the cost of 
the action rather than risk its not occurring . . . . The 
larger the group, the less likely it is that the individual will 
be willing to pay for the group’s consumption, and the 
greater is the individual’s incentive to try to pass the cost 
to other group members.  Larger groups will therefore 
encounter more difficulty organizing and securing the 
desired good . . . for its members . . . . Larger groups, 
particularly those as large as the “general public,” . . . may 
be entirely unable to make effective bribe offers to 
legislators.191 
Thus, the victim under a public choice theory model is not likely to 
be the minority.  Instead, the victim appears to be the “majority 
 
(1995); Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 921 (1998). 
 184. See Kahn, supra note 183, at 288. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 288-89. 
 188. Id. at 289. 
 189. Id. at 290. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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who [has] been legislatively robbed by a well-organized minority.”192 
The interest groups lobbying for regulation that benefits their 
interests, often to the detriment of others, generally prefer federal 
regulation to state regulation, especially when dealing with 
interjurisdictional issues such as securities market regulation.193  For 
starters, it is generally “cheaper to obtain passage of one federal bill 
rather than fifty separate ones.”194  Moreover, even if interest 
groups succeed in getting a regulatory bill passed at the state level, 
they must still appeal to the federal level to prevent federal law 
from preempting the bill.195  Finally, “federal law is more difficult to 
avoid than is state law.”196  Those trying to avoid state law may 
escape the effects of that law by relocating, but one cannot so easily 
avoid federal law.197  As a result, the federal government and its 
agencies may be subject to more pressure from these various 
interest groups than are state governments and agencies when it 
comes to securities regulation and enforcement areas. 
Therefore, because of the potential for defects and abuses in 
the federal market for securities regulation, secondary avenues of 
enforcement must exist.  If securities regulations are not 
adequately enforced, investor confidence will suffer, as will the 
market as a whole.  In order for the investing public to be 
confident that their interests are being protected in an 
environment dominated by interest groups, the states must be 
allowed to function as a secondary avenue of enforcement.198 
 
 192. See Hovenkamp, supra note 183, at 87. 
 193. See Ulen, supra note 183, at 940. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Arguably, the only feasible options for the enforcement of securities laws 
are to have total federal preemption or have some form of dual enforcement.  It is 
the position of this article that dual enforcement can be a benefit and is a 
necessary consequence of public choice theory.  Some commentators, however, 
have made the argument that perhaps SROs are better suited than the 
government to regulate corporate governance.  See Thompson, supra note 160; see 
also, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 
54 SMU L. REV. 325, 327 (2001); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997); A.C. Pritchard, Market as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace 
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999); 
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 
107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). 
Although this article does not attempt to evaluate the potential strength of such an 
argument, there is one obvious flaw with this argument that works in favor of the 
position advanced by this article—not every company that trades securities is 
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The events of the past few months have shown us that the 
investing public cannot rely solely on the federal government for 
protection.  For example, current and former officials of the SEC 
said that the current mutual fund scandal is a result of the SEC 
being held “captive to the [mutual fund] industry.”199  A former 
official in the Clinton administration stated that, 
There have been decades of looking the other way . . . .  
At its core, the scandals reflect the fact that mutual fund 
governance is broken and Washington has stood by and 
allowed it to remain broken, for a long time, without any 
real effort to reform the system to the benefit of 
investors.200 
Current SEC officials have stated that “none of the more than a 
dozen cases that have now been brought resulted from routine 
inspections by the commission.”201  In fact, before state regulators 
exposed the recent mutual fund scandals, the SEC’s examination 
unit was not even assigned to look for these kinds of abuses.202 
Furthermore, critics of the SEC and former officials claim that 
the Investment Company Institute (the “ICI”), the mutual fund 
industry’s trade organization, exerted enormous influence over 
both the SEC and Congress, resulting in lax enforcement policies 
for mutual funds.203  A recent example of the mutual fund 
industry’s clout is evidenced by certain provisions in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 that were enacted at the insistence of the ICI.  
“[T]he drafters granted the mutual fund industry significant 
exemptions from some of the more important provisions” of the 
Act, including conflict-of-interest rules, disclosure rules, and 
internal monitoring controls.204  Additionally, Lynn E. Turner, a 
former chief accountant at the SEC, said it was routine for SEC 
 
subject to the listing requirements of the national exchanges.  Therefore, the 
potential would still exist for small-scale securities fraud.  Arguably, the federal 
government would not find such scams worthy of its involvement even if securities 
regulation were not totally up to the SROs, but such fraud would still be subject to 
state securities laws if the dual enforcement scheme were left in place. 
 199. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.’s Oversight of Mutual Funds Is Said to Be Lax, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at B2. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id.; see also David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Shirking at the SEC: 
The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 361 (1985) 
(noting that the SEC is captured by special interests and therefore protects 
entrenched institutions rather than the investing public). 
 204. Labaton, supra note 199, at B2. 
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officials to consider the views of the ICI and that it was rare for the 
SEC to adopt a regulation that went against ICI’s interests.205 
The size of the SEC staff charged with overseeing the mutual 
fund industry is also problematic.  For the past decade the Office of 
Compliance Inspections and Examinations has been both 
neglected and understaffed.206  Until earlier this year the staff had 
“a total of 350 examiners and support staff to monitor an industry 
of 13,000 mutual funds and investment advisors.”207  Although the 
mutual fund industry has grown significantly through the years, 
inspectors did not significantly increase the rate or depth of 
inspections.208  Inspections went from once every five years to once 
every two for the largest firms.209  Thus, had the state regulators not 
begun their own investigations into the mutual fund industry, 
improper trading might have continued indefinitely. 
Another reason for state enforcement is that federal 
government enforcement is selective.  There have been many 
instances of federal intervention in corporate lawmaking.210  Some 
of the more notable instances are: 1) “issues of antitrust and 
corporate reorganization”; 2) “1930s issues of shareholder voting 
and insider trading”; 3) SEC’s 1950s proxy rules that impeded 
proxy fights the states had allowed; 4) the 1960s Williams Act that 
softened the tough takeover bidder tactics that the states had been 
permitting; 5) “1970s issues of going private”; 6) “1970s issues of 
fiduciary duties”; 7) “1980s issues of power in takeovers”; and 8) 
“early twenty-first century issues of scandals and effective internal 
governance.”211  In each case, “one could argue that ouster . . . was 
‘special’—so important to the national economy that the ‘normal 
science’ of state corporate law-making did not apply.  But that is 
exactly the point: when the issue is important, federal players oust 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.  Some might argue that even if the SEC had a substantial increase in 
resources, it would continue to inadequately investigate every incident involving 
fraud or abuse, thus calling into question its stated goals of investor protection.  
See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal 
Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 969 (1994) (citing 
Securities Fraud Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing & Urban Affairs, 183d Cong. 5 (June 17, 1993) (statement of William R. 
McLucas)). 
 207. Labaton, supra note 199, at B2. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Roe, supra note 160, at 634. 
 211. Id. 
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the states, or threaten to.”212  Unfortunately, by the time the federal 
government does become involved, it is often too late.213 
This is evidenced once again by the recent mutual fund 
scandal.  Arguably, the SEC and the states both had the ability to 
enforce the improper trading and fees charged by mutual funds—
the states, however, uncovered the improper trading and fee-
charging schemes and brought them to the attention of the SEC.  
The SEC, despite its assertions that it should be the primary 
regulator of the securities market, was caught totally unaware that 
this scandal was taking place.  Only after the scandal became front-
page news and threatened to undermine the authority of the SEC 
did the SEC “[lay] firm claim to mutual fund turf” and voice 
disapproval at the possibility “that state regulators . . . might try to 
set new rules.”214  Once again, the federal government decided to 
take action, but only after the scandal publicly called into question 
the ability of the SEC to effectively enforce the securities market.  
Arguably, the SEC had a chance to strengthen its policies regarding 
mutual funds when it passed Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002.  However, the 
influence of the ITI on the SEC appears to have hampered any 
such attempt.215 
In light of the foregoing arguments, dual regulation of the 
securities market appears to be the most effective method of both 
maintaining investor confidence and ensuring the continued 
viability of the securities market.  Additionally, dual regulation of 
the securities market is an efficient method of securities regulation. 
B.  Dual Enforcement, Better Known As Federalism, Is Not Inefficient 
Contrary to what some might argue, dual regulation of the 
securities market is not inefficient.  Having both state and federal 
securities enforcement is efficient because federalism itself is 
efficient.  The core values of federalism, “citizen participation in 
government, efficiency in government, creative experimentation, 
and diffusion of power” are served by a dual regulatory system.216 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Floyd Norris, Is the Mutual Fund Issue Abuses, or Is It Fees?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
19, 2003, at B4. 
 215. Labaton, supra note 199, at B2. 
 216. See Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to 
Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227, 230-31 (1987). 
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1.  Competition 
In a market-driven economy, competition is usually seen as the 
engine that drives efficient outcomes; conversely, monopoly is 
viewed as inefficient, both because of the allocative inefficiencies 
inherent in monopoly pricing and, more relevant to the present 
problem, because absence of competition removes the incentive to 
achieve efficient utilization of resources in pursuing the task at 
hand.217  Competition can, of course, be wasteful and inefficient, 
but our national commitment to the market and competition 
suggests that it is better to err by permitting competition than to 
assume that some centralized control will match the invisible hand 
in assuring both allocative and productive efficiencies.218 
While we do not usually view law enforcement as a competitive 
enterprise, there has often been competition between different 
jurisdictions for the law enforcement service they are producing.  
Federalism itself necessarily envisions a kind of competition.  Some 
of this competition is in law production, with different jurisdictions 
enacting different laws.  In the United States, this competition is 
regulated by the notion of enumerated powers219 and preemption220 
 
 217. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 2001). 
[E]conomic theory provides a solid basis for the belief that monopoly 
pricing, which results when firms create an artificial scarcity of their 
product and thereby drive price above its level under competition, is 
presumptively inefficient in the sense most commonly used by 
economists in discussing issues of monopoly and competition (the 
Kaldor-Hicks, or potential Pareto, sense of efficiency).  Since efficiency 
is an important social value, this conclusion establishes a prima facie 
case for having an antitrust policy.  It also implies the limitations of 
that policy: to the extent that efficiency is the goal of antitrust 
enforcement, there is no justification for carrying enforcement into 
areas where competition is less efficient than monopoly because the 
costs of monopoly pricing are outweighed by the economies of 
centralized  production in one or a very few firms.  That is why I 
referred to monopoly pricing as “presumptively” inefficient and as 
creating merely a “prima facie” case for having an antitrust policy. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 218. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958) 
(“[U]nrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of 
our economic resources . . . .”). 
 219. Federalism, in the context of the Tenth Amendment, refers to the 
division of powers between the state and federal governments.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. X.  Specifically, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”  Id.  In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992), the Court held that the Tenth Amendment imposes a limit on Congress’s 
power.  According to the Court, “the preservation of the States, and the 
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(in regulating competition between the states and the federal 
government) and by a variety of mechanisms, including the full 
faith and credit clause,221 the privileges and immunities clause,222 
the right to travel,223 and the dormant commerce clause224 (in 
 
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the 
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the 
National Government.”  Id. at 162 (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 
(1869)).  Therefore, “Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program.’ ”  Id. at 161 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 
264, 268 (1981). 
 220. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, “federal law will 
preempt any state law with which there is a conflict if Congress intends such a 
result.”  Francis J. Facciolo & Richard L. Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable: The 
Continuing Viability of State Law Claims in the Face of Primary Jurisdiction and 
Preemption Challenges Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 525, 531; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-26, at 491 (2d ed. 1988) (“Generally speaking, 
the Court has come to sanction state regulations that supplement federal efforts so 
long as compliance with the letter or effectuation of the purpose of the federal 
enactment is not likely to be significantly impeded by the state law.”). 
 221. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”). 
 222. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states.”). 
 223. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (“[T]he nature 
of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to 
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our 
land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or 
restrict this movement.”). 
 224. In absence of affirmative consent, a congressional negative will be 
presumed against state action that in its effect upon interstate commerce 
constitutes an unreasonable burden or interference.  The dormant commerce 
clause thus assumes that Congress prohibits state action until or unless it 
authorizes it.  See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194-95 
(1994) (holding that a state tax imposed on both local and out-of-state dairy 
farmers was unconstitutional because the revenue received from the tax was used 
to subsidize only local, in-state farmers, thus giving them an advantage over out-of-
state farmers); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 
(1994) (holding that an ordinance subsidizing a private waste transfer station was 
unconstitutional because while the immediate effect was to direct local transport 
of waste to a designated site within the local jurisdiction, its economic effects were 
interstate in reach); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S 617, 629 (1978) 
(holding that a New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of out-of-state waste 
was unconstitutional); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 
352-54 (1977) (holding that a state statute requiring all apples sold or shipped in 
the state to use a USDA quality label was unconstitutional); cf. Exxon Corp. v. 
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1978) (holding that a state statute 
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regulating competition among the states in law production). 
Other competition is in law enforcement—either of the same 
laws, where different enforcers can bring suits challenging the 
same conduct under the same statute, or of different but analog 
laws with different enforcers being authorized under different 
regimes to attack the same or very similar conduct.  Although some 
statutes permitting private suit introduce yet another set of entrants 
in the law enforcement market, the current focus is on maximizing 
the efficiency of law enforcement by state authorities, typically the 
state attorney general. 
2.  Citizen Participation in Government 
Active participation by citizens is “a means of strengthening 
the representativeness of governmental institutions and enhancing 
the perception of its legitimacy.”225  When government operates on 
a smaller scale, “individuals can participate more effectively and 
more directly.”226  If citizens are able to organize at the local or state 
level, they can have a greater influence at the federal level.227  This 
can help combat against interest groups lobbying the federal 
government to get certain self-serving legislation passed or held up. 
Proximity is also believed to “increase[] access, 
communication, and accountability between citizens and public 
officials.”228  In a system where dual regulation exists, citizens are 
better able to participate in market enforcement.  For example, 
Spitzer’s investigation into the mutual funds was the result of a 
“whistle-blower’s tip.”229  It is unclear whether that same person 
attempted to contact the SEC and was stonewalled or whether only 
state officials were contacted.  Regardless, state officials were the 
ones who received and acted on the tip. 
Additionally, political accountability supports the argument for 
 
providing that a producer or refiner of petroleum products could not operate a 
retail service station within the state was constitutional because the fact that a 
burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself, 
establish a claim that the statute violates the constitution). 
 225. Jorde, supra note 216, at 231 (internal citations omitted).  See generally 
Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action 
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory 
Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997). 
 226. See Jorde, supra note 216, at 231. 
 227. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 
YALE L.J. 947, 999 (2001). 
 228. See Jorde, supra note 216, at 231. 
 229. See Atlas, supra note 1. 
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dual enforcement.  Neither the state nor the federal government 
wants to be seen as allowing market abuses to occur at the expense 
of the investing public because they will be held accountable for 
their actions, or inaction.  The inevitable result is a regulatory 
competition between the state and federal government to see who 
can eliminate potential market abuses.  This will promote investors’ 
interests and the integrity of the market as a whole. 
3.  Efficiency in Government 
Allowing state enforcement of securities regulations as a 
secondary enforcement mechanism means that only fifty attorneys 
general could potentially bring suit for violation of securities laws.  
The scope of state enforcement is not unlimited.  Concededly, 
allowing private rights of action in these types of situations could 
very well lead to inefficient uses of resources and time.  This article, 
however, is limited to state enforcement by the attorneys general. 
Additionally, the existence of overlapping state and federal 
jurisdiction does not mean that both the state and federal 
government will take action in any given situation, as evidenced by 
the recent mutual fund scandal.  Overlapping jurisdiction did exist 
but it was far from being inefficient.  To begin with, the federal 
government did not take any action until after the states had spent 
their own resources investigating and uncovering the scandal.  
Thus, there was no initial cost attributed to the federal government 
as enforcer because the federal government was not involved until 
much later in the process.  Moreover, the existence of prosecutorial 
discretion necessarily means that overlapping jurisdiction does not 
necessarily result in duplicative enforcement. 
Dual regulation also results in government efficiency because a 
national securities regulator would possess “neither the systematic 
knowledge of local conditions nor the flexibility required for wise 
administration.”230  In contrast, “[s]tates and localities are sensitive 
 
 230. See Jorde, supra note 216, at 232. 
A recent example illustrating the importance of dual regulation is the financial 
demise of Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities, a financial services firm in 
Spokane, Washington, and its subsidiary, Summit Securities.  Gretchen 
Morgenson, Call In the Feds. Uh, Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, at 3-1.  
Metropolitan Mortgage was a financial firm known for its dependability and many 
Washington residents invested in securities issued by the company.  Id.  
Unfortunately, about 35,000 local investors have lost significant amounts of money 
in the last few months.  Id.  “[L]ate last year, Metropolitan and . . . Summit . . . 
stopped paying interest on some $600 million of securities . . . .”  Id.  Then, in 
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to local interest and residents.”231  States are more likely to be 
concerned with local interests that might otherwise be missed by 
the SEC and the federal government.  Although the mutual fund 
scandal is arguably of national interest, many of the firms involved 
do business in New York City.  This supports the argument that 
Spitzer’s actions were part of an effort to protect the interests of the 
citizens of New York, and that states are often more in tune with 
local interests than the federal government. 
Assuming that some inefficiencies do exist here, the benefits of 
dual regulation outweigh any costs.  The SEC, in response to the 
recent mutual fund scandal, issued proposals that “would require 
more independent directors, . . . require directors of funds to 
perform annual evaluations of their effectiveness, and would 
permit [directors] to hire their own staff so they would not rely too 
heavily on the fund’s investment advisors.”232  These new proposals 
would not have been issued if the states had not brought the 
scandal to light.  Additionally, Congress “is considering its own 
measures to beef up penalties for mutual fund fraud, amid concern 
the SEC was slow to act.”233  If state enforcement can drive a 
national effort for reform, the benefits are clear—investor 
 
January of 2004, “Ernst & Young, the companies’ auditor, resigned, saying it had 
found ‘material misstatements’ in their financial reports going back three years.”  
Id.  Finally, on February 4, both Metropolitan and Summit filed for bankruptcy 
protection.  Id. 
One investor was understandably upset by the firm’s sudden demise: “The 
company looked like a good company . . . everybody trusted what they were being 
told. . . . With people’s money at stake, where in heck were the regulators at, and 
the people who are supposed to keep an eye on this?”  Id. (internal quotations 
omitted).  The question is a fair question and the answer is that the regulators 
were in Washington.  Id.  “Because of a federal law intended to streamline 
securities regulation, the toughest cops on Metropolitan’s turf—officials in 
Washington State’s department of financial institutions—were essentially taken off 
the beat in 2000.”  Id.  Thus, state regulators, “who had kept Metropolitan on a 
short leash, could only watch . . . as the company sold more securities . . . than it 
could easily repay.”  Id. 
This is exactly the kind of situation that calls for there to be both state and federal 
regulation of the securities industry.  It lends support to the argument that 
“federal regulators have recently been less vigilant than some of their state 
counterparts in supervising financial companies.”  Id. 
 231. See Ulen, supra note 183, at 946. 
 232. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Outlines Plan for Tightening Grip on Mutual Funds, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at C1. 
 233. SEC, Under Fire, Outlines New Fund Rules (Nov. 18, 2003), at 
http://www.boston.com:80/business/articles/2003/11/18/sec_under_fire_outlin
es_new_fund_rules (last visited May 15, 2004). 
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confidence and the integrity of the market are strengthened by 
aggressive state action leading to national reforms. 
4.  Creative Experimentation 
Decentralization, the result of having a dual regulatory system, 
allows for greater experimentation to satisfy local interests and 
needs.234  In celebrating the potential role of the states, Justice 
Brandeis once stated, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”235  “The 
opportunity for creative experimentation, innovation, and 
invention is probably most important [when] economic activity [is 
involved].”236  “Economies are dynamic and change is often fast-
paced.”237  “Economic federalism permits states to respond rapidly 
and in a variety of ways to perceived market and regulatory 
needs.”238  Allowing the states to develop different, and perhaps 
more effective, regulatory mechanisms to protect the integrity of 
the securities market will ultimately benefit the investing public.  
Should a state create a more effective system than that of another 
state, or of the federal government, the latter jurisdictions can 
benefit by adapting their own systems to make them more effective. 
5.  Diffusion of Power 
Finally, dual sovereignty and limited central government 
promote the sharing of governmental control.239  A balance of 
power between governments reduces risk of abuse, thereby helping 
reduce potential inefficiencies.240  As noted by Justice Powell: 
 
 234. See Bellia, supra note 227, at 999-1000 (arguing that federalism “serves the 
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society and promotes experimentation with 
different programs”); see also Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 225, at 1217-18. 
 235. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95 (citing Justice Brandeis’s dissenting 
opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)). 
 236. See Jorde, supra note 216, at 233. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997) (stating that the 
system designed by the Framers is one in which federal and state governments 
exercise concurrent authority, rather than the federal government acting through 
the states); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162  (1992) (stating that “the 
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to 
require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions”). 
 240. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921. 
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The Framers believed that the separate sphere of 
sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the 
States would serve as an effective “counterpoise” to the 
power of the Federal Government.  The States would serve 
this essential role because they would attract and retain 
the loyalty of their citizens.  The roots of such loyalty, the 
Founders thought, were found in the objects peculiar to 
state government.241 
A dual regulatory system protects against the reality that the federal 
government is not, and cannot, always protect the investing public.  
Eliminating the possibility of state enforcement of securities laws 
takes away a strong alternative means of enforcement.  Given the 
savvy nature of the key players in the securities markets today, 
eliminating the only feasible alternate method of enforcement is 
not in the best interests of the investing public. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
States do have an important role to play in the enforcement of 
securities laws because of the limitations placed on the federal 
government by the public choice theory.  An alternative method of 
enforcement is needed for the following scenarios: 1) instances in 
which federal regulation is too lax, and 2) instances in which state 
action can highlight gaps in federal enforcement either because 
gaps exist in the regulations themselves, or because the federal 
government is not aware of certain abuses of the market.  When 
state action is used as an alternative means of enforcement, as done 
by Eliot Spitzer in New York, the investing public can reap the 
benefits of this state action.  Where state action does not fit into the 
above model but is instead similar to the actions taken by Drew 
Edmondson in Oklahoma, state action is duplicative, costly, and 
largely ineffective.  It is this latter form of state action—based solely 
on personal distaste for what is an informed decision by the SEC to 
not bring charges against Bernard Ebbers and to allow WorldCom 
to enter Chapter 11 proceedings—that fuels the arguments against 
allowing state enforcement of securities laws. 
 
 241. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 571 (1985) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/2
